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TEMPORAL ROUTINES FOR GENERATIONAL PRODUCT INNOVATION  
IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study uses a routines-based theoretical lens to examine time-based pacing of generational 
product innovation in the applications software industry.  We develop a temporal routines model 
to explain the effect of time since previous innovation on generational product innovation.  The 
model further suggests that organizational size moderates the time-pacing relationship.  
Employing event history analysis, we examined forty-six organizations competing in four 
segments of business productivity software from 1994 to 1998.  We found empirical evidence 
consistent with our temporal routines model, indicating that software organizations, particularly 
larger organizations, employ temporal routines for generational product innovation. 
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TEMPORAL ROUTINES FOR GENERATIONAL PRODUCT INNOVATION  
IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
 
Time-based pacing of innovation has drawn recent interest from academics (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Bluedorn, 2002) and practitioners (Economist, 2003).  Time-based pacing 
typically involves generational forms of innovation.  A generational product innovation 
represents a significant advance in the technical performance of an existing product (Lawless and 
Anderson, 1996).  In turn, time-based pacing of innovation refers to releasing new generations of 
a product in a consistent pattern, such as releasing a new generation every 18 months.  
Generational product innovations are often central to technological decision-making in 
organizations and have an important effect on organizational performance (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997).  As an example, the inability to successfully manage generational product 
innovation contributed to the failure of Lotus 1-2-3 in applications software (InfoWorld, 1985, 
1988a) and to the decline of the Ford Taurus as the leading sedan in the automobile industry 
(Automotive News, 2003). 
 
In prior theory-building research, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) provide a rich understanding of 
the performance consequences from employing time-based pacing of generational product 
innovation.  However, we have limited understanding as to why organizations employ time-
based pacing of innovation.  The purpose of this study is to develop our understanding of why 
organizations might employ time-based pacing of generational product innovation and to 
demonstrate that time-based pacing exists in practice.  We use a routines-based theoretical lens 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) to examine this phenomenon, viewing time-based pacing of 
innovation as a particular form of modification routine.  Further, we examine organizational size 
as a core determinant of the employment of temporal routines for generational product 
innovation.  This study contributes to our understanding of innovation as a routine process.  Our 
empirical context focuses on four business productivity segments of the U. S. microcomputer 
software industry from 1994 to 1998, including computer-aided design (CAD), desktop 
publishing, spreadsheets, and word-processing.  We undertake event history analysis, offering a 
comparison of results using discrete-time and continuous-time approaches. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
From the perspective of routines-based theory, organizations function according to a set of 
routines, in contrast with traditional economic theory that assumes that organizations adaptively 
optimize their behavior.  Routines are repetitive patterns of organizational behavior (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  More specifically, a routine is an executable capability for repeated performance 
in a particular context (Cohen, et al., 1996).  We consider routines as involving both automatic 
action patterns that proceed without managerial choices and action patterns that involve 
deliberate choices to maintain the routines. 
 
Routines are often viewed in a hierarchy of operating and modification types.  Operating routines 
are standard patterns of organization activity in a given context.  Modification routines are 
patterns of activity that systematically change the operating routines of an organization (Nelson, 
1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  This study aligns with the tradition of examining routines in 
the form of self-sustaining operating and modification types.  Nelson and Winter (1982) provide   2
the self-sustaining condition as a basic assumption of the evolutionary model, highlighting that 
routines become established among organizational members.  Nelson and Winter (1982) refer to 
this establishment as a de facto contract, or "routine as truce."  
 
We consider routines-based research in two categories: (1) research that examines organizations 
as a portfolio of routines, and (2) research that examines a particular routine within organizations 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Cohen, et al., 1996).  In the first category, researchers focus on the 
process by which organizations function according to a set of routines (i.e., Cyert and March, 
1992/1963; Karim and Mitchell, 2000).  In the second category, researchers focus on a particular 
routine, which is composed of sub-level routines and resources (Pentland and Rueter, 1994; 
Feldman, 2000).  This study falls into the latter group, as it addresses a particular routine. 
 
Our focal routine is the temporal routine for generational product innovation.  At the business 
unit level, the product of interest represents a core component in the organization's operating 
routines.  A generational product innovation represents a significant change in the product and, 
correspondingly, in the product-related components of the organization's operating routines.  As 
such, a temporal routine for generational product innovation is a particular type of modification 
routine, where changes to the product and the product-related components of a set of operating 
routines occur on a consistent basis across time. 
 
We initially outline the boundary conditions, assumptions, and concepts that shape our research. 
We then turn to specific hypotheses. 
 
Boundary conditions, assumptions, and concepts 
 
Two boundary conditions define the scope within which our theoretical perspective will consider 
the phenomenon of time-based pacing.  First, we concentrate on routines involving product 
change, where products produced by one set of organizations (producers) are employed as inputs 
for production by another set of organizations (organizational customers).  Although all products 
do not need to be sold to organizations, our argument emphasizes organizations as a significant 
base of customers for the producers.   
 
Second, our argument focuses on products that are interdependent with other components in the 
operating routines of producers and their organizational customers.  In this sense, routines are 
complex systems composed of sub-level components (Simon, 1962; Nelson, 1991).  The second 
condition implies that the addition of a new product, or change in an existing product, results in 
non-trivial disruption costs for one of more operating routines within the organization.  For 
example, consider the producer of a computer software application.  When the producer changes 
the product (i.e., releases a new version), a corresponding series of changes are required within 
the organization (e.g., customer support training).  In a recent study, Mukherjee, et al. (2000) 
found evidence consistent with the idea that variation in a set of inputs results in disrupted 
performance of the routine. 
 
Within these boundary conditions, our argument requires several assumptions.  Foremost, the 
argument hinges on the assumptions of routines-based theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  The 
argument also requires two additional assumptions.   3
 
First, we assume that organizations have favorable perceptions of change to an existing product.  
In studying the automobile industry, Abernathy (1978) observed that important functional 
improvements are made in the early stages of product life.  These functional improvements 
provide substantial value to customers (Abernathy, 1978).  While Abernathy's research supports 
the value of early-stage innovation, we suggest greater generality of the assumption.  In 
particular, we expect organizations to have favorable perceptions of product change in 
environments with significant technological opportunity.  
 
Second, we assume that producers will make changes to an existing product in line with the 
preferences of their existing customers.  Resource dependence theory supports this assumption.  
According to this theory, organizations are interdependent with resource providers in the external 
environment, and resource providers influence the behavior of their resource-dependent 
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Research by Clayton Christensen extends resource 
dependence theory, highlighting that the demands from an organization's existing customers 
drive its resource allocation decisions.  In particular, this research found that the preferences of 
firms' existing customers strongly shape the path of technological innovation in the hard disk 
drive industry (Christensen and Bower, 1996). 
 
The argument builds on three core concepts: generational product innovation, time since 
previous innovation, and organizational size. To define the generational product innovation 
concept, we refer to Henderson and Clark (1990) and Lawless and Anderson (1996).  Henderson 
and Clark (1990) define product innovations along two dimensions: (1) degree of change in core 
design concepts, and (2) degree of change in the linkages among core components.   The first 
dimension focuses attention on the extent to which core product attributes are reinforced relative 
to being overturned, while the second dimension focuses on the extent to which the product 
architecture changes.  This study focuses on product innovations in which the core design 
concepts are reinforced and the product architecture is unchanged.  Henderson and Clark (1990) 
refer to this type of innovation as an incremental innovation. 
 
According to Lawless and Anderson (1996), a generational product innovation is a particular 
form of incremental innovation.  The researchers state that generational innovations have two 
focal characteristics.  First, the innovation represents a significant advance in the technical 
performance of an existing product.  Lawless and Anderson (1996) describe a generational 
innovation as an advance within a technology regime.  Second, most generational product 
innovations are backward-compatible, such that older generations tend to compete alongside 
newer generations (Lawless and Anderson, 1996).   
 
Alternatively, some researchers have described architectural innovations as generational 
innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990, footnote 1; Henderson, 1993).  Similar to incremental 
innovations, architectural innovations reinforce the core design concepts of the product.  
However, with architectural innovations, the linkages between the core concepts also change 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990).  In this study, we do not include architectural forms of innovation 
within our definition of generational product innovation.  This allows greater focus in developing 
our conceptual argument.  Further, in our empirical context, architectural product innovations   4
typically represent entry into new technological markets (i.e., Windows) for existing 
organizations.  Therefore, we treat these innovations as new market entries. 
 
To clarify the definition of generational product innovation, we present an example from the 
AutoSketch family of CAD microcomputer software.  In this example, we classify the 
introduction of AutoSketch 3.0, which followed AutoSketch 2.0 (both DOS products), as a 
generational product innovation.  Relative to AutoSketch 2.0, AutoSketch 3.0 contained new 
features that improved its performance, particularly its ease of use and ease of learning.  As one 
example, AutoSketch 3.0 added a new text editor that allowed users to import and export text.  In 
turn, we classify the introduction of AutoSketch for Windows as an architectural product 
innovation.  In summary, a generational product innovation is a significant advance in the 
technical performance of an existing product; the core concepts of the product are reinforced 
within an existing architecture (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Lawless and Anderson, 1996). 
 
The notion of time since previous innovation draws from the organizational ecology literature 
(Amburgey, et al., 1993; Baum, 1999). We define this concept as the elapsed time since the 
previous product innovation of the same type.  With respect to generational product innovation, 
previous product innovation of the same type refers to either the initial introduction of the 
product on the market or the most recent generational product innovation introduced to the 
market. 
 
Organizational ecology researchers have argued for a negative effect of time since previous 
innovation on the likelihood of another innovation of the same type (Amburgey, et al., 1993).  
The focal argument is that, by local search in time, organizations are most likely to employ 
recently-used modification routines (Amburgey, et al., 1993; Cyert and March, 1992/1963).  
Therefore, as the elapsed time since a previous innovation increases, the organization is less 
likely to introduce an innovation of the same type (Amburgey, et al., 1993; Baum, 1999). 
 
Returning to the AutoSketch product example, after the organization’s initial release of 
AutoSketch, the time since previous innovation increments by one for each time period until the 
firm releases a generational product innovation (AutoSketch 2.0).  In the first period following 
the release of AutoSketch 2.0, the time since previous innovation resets to one.  The time count 
then increments by one for each period, until the organization releases another generational 
product innovation. In summary, we define time since previous innovation as the elapsed time 
since the previous product innovation of the same type. 
 
In defining organizational size, we refer to innovation research in the industrial organization 
economics and organizational ecology literatures.  These literatures focus on two dimensions of 
organizational size: external to the organization and internal to the organization.  Both 
dimensions arise in industrial organization economics and organizational ecology, but industrial 
organization economics places greater emphasis on the external dimension (Scherer, 1980), 
while organizational ecology places greater emphasis on the internal dimension (Baum, 1999).  
Incorporating both dimensions, organizational size represents the magnitude of an organizational 
unit. 
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From the external perspective, researchers often operationalize organizational size as the volume 
of sales for a given organizational unit (Cohen and Levin, 1989).  In industrial organization 
economics, the external perspective reflects a market-based orientation.  Schumpeterian 
researchers present several conceptual arguments for a positive effect of size on innovation.  
These arguments include (a) size correlates with available financial resources in imperfect 
markets, suggesting that larger organizations have greater ability to undertake innovation, and (b) 
size provides scale economies, such that larger organizations can justify greater investment in 
specialized resources for producing innovations or justify greater investment in process 
innovations from a cost-spreading perspective (Scherer, 1980; Cohen and Klepper, 1996).  At the 
same time, though, more traditional industrial organization economics researchers expect a 
negative effect of size on innovation, based on reduced competitive incentives (Scherer, 1980). 
In parallel, organizational ecology researchers also use the external perspective to present 
arguments for both positive and negative effects of size on innovation (Haveman, 1993).   
 
From the internal perspective, researchers typically operationalize organizational size as the 
number of employees in the organizational unit.  In both organizational ecology and industrial 
organization economics, the internal perspective reflects a bureaucratic orientation.  From this 
perspective, researchers in organizational ecology expect a negative effect of size on innovation.  
These arguments suggest that larger organizations have greater diffusion of control and decision-
making, such that changing organizational structure is more difficult in larger organizations 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Haveman, 1993).  Researchers present a similar argument in 
industrial organization economics, suggesting that managerial control declines as organizations 
increase in size.  In addition, individual scientists have reduced incentive for innovation if their 
ability to capture the rewards of innovation decreases with increasing size (Cohen and Levin, 
1989). 
 
In the AutoSketch example, organizational size refers to the magnitude of the business unit that 
governs the development, production and support for the AutoSketch product.  From the external 
perspective, organizational size is the volume of sales of the AutoSketch product.  From the 
internal perspective, organizational size is the number of employees involved in the 
development, production and support of the AutoSketch product.  Our argument draws on both 
internal and external dimensions of organizational size, and consistent with prior research, we 
expect significant overlap between the respective measures.  Because of the key role of customer 
pressure in our argument, though, we place greater emphasis on the external dimension. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts the presence of temporal routines for generational product innovation 
within organizations.  For this argument, we must address both (a) demand for generational 
product innovation and (b) demand for consistency in the release of generational product 
innovations.  Recall that we assume that organizational perceptions of change to an existing 
product are favorable.  In particular, we consider two sources of pressure for generational 
product innovation.  First, there is exogenous pressure for product change based on technological 
and market opportunities in the environment (e.g., innovations in foundational technologies).   
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Second, there is endogenous pressure for product change that emanates within the operating 
routines of existing customers.  From our boundary conditions, as organizations make changes to 
components within their existing operating routines, there are disruptions due to 
interdependencies among the components of the operating routine.  In efforts to maintain their 
existing routines, organizations attempt to smooth out the induced disruptions, or frictions 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982).  By searching locally for solutions to the friction problem, 
organizations seek subsequent improvements, or modifications, to the most recently-changed 
component (Cyert and March, 1992/1963).  Therefore, as customer organizations adopt new or 
modified products, they generate pressure for subsequent changes to the product. 
 
In addition to demand for generational product innovation, there is demand for consistency in the 
release pattern.  One of Nelson and Winter’s (1982) central assumptions is that organizations 
behave according to a set of routines.  Establishing a routine for innovation at the organization 
level requires reliability in the delivery of inputs, including timeliness.  Organizations require 
this reliability to address temporal interdependencies and resource allocations (e.g., human 
resources across phases of a project), both within and across departments (March and Simon, 
1958).  By establishing temporal routines for innovation, producers have greater ability to 
coordinate the complex task of innovation (Cyert and March, 1992/1963; Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997).  These forces serve as an internal source of pressure for producers to create temporal 
routines for developing generational product innovations. 
 
In parallel with pressures for producer routines, organizational customers face internal pressures 
to create routines for adopting generational product innovations, especially in cases where 
adopting a changed product invokes substantial disruptions.  These disruptions reflect systemic 
changes that are required elsewhere in the organization as a result of the adoption of the changed 
product.  The requisite changes result from linkages among the focal product, complementary 
assets and services, and organizational employees with related responsibilities.  While computer 
software programs are a prime example (e.g., integrated with hardware and other software), 
many goods and services have similar linkages.  Given the associated disruptions, by 
establishing adoption routines, organizational customers facilitate planning and coordination. 
 
The benefits of adoption routines at customers and the preference for development routines at 
producers reinforce each other, leading to a strong propensity toward temporal reliability in the 
release of new products.  The reinforcement comes from both the supply side and demand side of 
the market.  From the supply side, the presence of producer routines and consequent tendency for 
regular product introduction will encourage organizational customers to develop systems suited 
to adopting innovations on a regular basis (e.g., “adopt every new generation of the product at 
the time of release”).  From the demand side, the existence of adoption routines leads customers 
to encourage temporal reliability in the release of generational product innovations (Amburgey 
and Miner, 1992).  Thus, the innovation routines of producers and the adoption routines of their 
organizational customers support one another, resulting in temporal alignment of generational 
product innovation.   
 
Note the presence of incentives for temporal alignment still permits heterogeneity across 
organizations.  In cases where there is a consistent cycle on the supply side (e.g., “introduce 
every year at the major trade show”) coupled with strong pressures for a particular adoption   7
cycle on the demand side (e.g., “adopt every summer when activity is slower”), then a market 
will tend to converge to a single generational product innovation pattern.  Often, though, the 
technical and adoption pressures will allow variety in cycles.  For example, some customers may 
develop adoption routines that are multiples of other customers’ routines, possibly with greater 
flexibility (e.g., “adopt every other generation of the product within several months of its 
release”).  Thus, while a certain degree of variation is present, the primary force of the argument 
is that producers exhibit temporal regularity in generational product innovation. 
 
The temporal alignment of routines helps explain why producer routines for innovation exist in 
competitive markets, despite seeming market pressures for producer flexibility.  Since routines 
provide value to both producers and organizational customers, markets welcome time-based 
pacing of innovation, particularly under conditions in which innovation adoption requires 
substantial adjustment costs.  Further, once the temporal routine becomes established, there is 
pressure for producers and organizational customers to maintain the established norm, in the 
sense of "routine as truce".  Figure 1 describes the expected relationship for Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1.  Generational product innovation will have an inverted-U relationship with 
time since previous innovation, first increasing and then decreasing beyond a threshold. 
 
Next we address the effect of organizational size on temporal routines for generational product 
innovation.  Specifically we consider internal pressure and customer pressure as leading to 
greater temporal consistency for the release of generational product innovations in larger 
organizations.  We present these two types of pressure as elements of a larger argument that 
focuses on the costs of coordinating change in an innovation routine. 
 
First, consider internal pressure.  As organizations become larger, coordination among agents, 
whether individuals or departments, plays an increasingly important role in organizational 
activity.  As part of the innovation routine at the organization level, departments develop routines 
that are consistent with the organization-level routine (Nelson, 1991; Winter, 1995).  This 
suggests that change in the routine at the organization level requires changing department-level 
routines as well as reestablishing post-change linkages among the department-level routines.   
 
Assuming that larger organizations have greater numbers of departments, they face greater costs 
of coordinating change based on the number and interactions of department-level routines 
(Simon, 1962).  Therefore, as organizations become larger, disrupting an established routine 
becomes more costly from a coordination perspective.  Alternatively, in smaller organizations, 
coordination among agents plays a relatively less important role.  In smaller organizations, there 
is less need to establish the routine for coordination purposes, and if established, the cost of 
disrupting the routine is smaller relative to larger organizations. 
 
Second, consider customer pressure.  We assume that, for planning and coordination purposes, 
organizational customers establish change routines in line with the innovation routines of 
producers.  This assumption that organizational customers follow producers in establishing 
change routines acknowledges the significant internal pressure behind innovation routines, which 
constrains the ability of producers to adapt their routines in response to variations in customer 
preferences.  Given this producer-customer linkage of routines, as producers change their   8
innovation routines, their organizational customers face significant pressure to change their 
routines.   
 
If producers are sensitive to their impact on customer routines, they will attempt to communicate 
and/or negotiate changes in innovation routines with their organizational customers.  In 
applications software, the development of this producer sensitivity was particularly clear in the 
case of Lotus.  For instance, due to compatibility problems, an early generational product 
innovation for Lotus 1-2-3 (Release 2) caused major disruptions for organizational customers 
(InfoWorld, 1985).   The resulting customer pressure led to increased sensitivity regarding the 
producer-customer innovation linkage (InfoWorld, 1989), both in terms of content (i.e., inter-
generational compatibility) and timing (i.e., communications involving release schedules). 
 
Since larger organizations have greater numbers of organizational customers, they face greater 
costs of coordinating intended changes in their innovation routines.  Therefore, we expect greater 
adherence to innovation routines in larger organizations.  Figure 2 describes the expected 
relationship for Hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  The greater the organizational size, the more positive the initial effect of 
time since previous innovation on the likelihood of generational product innovation.  
Beyond a threshold, the greater the organizational size, the more negative the effect of 
time since previous innovation on the likelihood of generational product innovation. 
 
Taken together, these hypotheses suggest that organizations employ temporal routines for 
generational product innovation.  Moreover, as organizations increase in size, they are more 
likely to employ these routines. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The empirical context focuses on business productivity segments of the U. S. microcomputer 
software applications industry from 1994 to 1998.  We examine organizations in four segments: 
computer-aided design (CAD), desktop-publishing, spreadsheets, and word-processing.   
 
Appropriateness of the empirical context 
 
We consider applications software relative to the boundary conditions and assumptions that we 
stated earlier.  The trade press for the software industry provides supporting evidence for the 
boundary conditions and assumptions. 
 
The first boundary condition limits the scope of the theoretical argument to situations in which 
products are produced by one set of organizations (producers) and are employed as inputs for 
production by another set of organizations (organizational customers).  This condition recognizes 
that corporate customers are a significant presence in markets for business productivity software 
products.   
 
The second boundary condition limits the scope of the argument to products that, upon adoption, 
become interdependent with other components in the operating routines of producers and   9
organizational customers.  This condition implies that the addition of a product, or change in the 
product, results in non-trivial disruptions for one or more operating routines.  In the applications 
software industry, there is substantial support for the assertion that the addition of, or change in, 
a software product results in non-trivial disruptions to existing operating routines for adopting 
organizations.  According to one administrator, the upgrade process is a "logistical nightmare."  
Another remarks that "the cost of the package is peanuts compared to the amount of 
administrative time involved in an upgrade" (InfoWorld, 1988b).   Specific examples include 
downtime associated with new bugs, revision of training programs, logistical costs of 
installation, increases in support questions following an upgrade, and hardware upgrades that 
software upgrades may induce (i.e., InfoWorld, 1988b). 
 
The first assumption states that organizational perceptions of changes to an existing product are 
favorable.  This assumption is valid for software applications.  As an example from the demand 
side of product change, Wordstar was an early leader in the market for word-processing 
software.  At one point, an industry observer noted that "Wordstar users have been practically 
begging Micropro for a new update of their favorite word processor..." (InfoWorld, 1987).  On 
the supply side, Cringely (1996: 226) notes that producers immediately begin revisions to their 
product releases in order to fix bugs and stay current with the technology.  Researchers observe 
that, in the case of Microsoft, persistence with upgrades has contributed to success in the 
marketplace (Cusumano and Selby, 1995; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999).
1 
 
The second assumption states that producers will make changes to an existing product in line 
with the preferences of their existing organizational customers.  This assumption is appropriate 
for product innovations by many organizations in the application software industry.  When 
releasing generational product innovations, organizations often highlight the role of existing 
customers in shaping the innovation process.  Representative comments include "the new release 
of Total Word incorporates improvements requested by our customers" offered by Vickie 
Boddie, president of Volkswriter (Computer Reseller News, 1990), and "639 user enhancement 
requests have been incorporated into WordPerfect 6.0 for DOS" (Business Wire, 1993).  Perhaps 
the strongest statement in support of this assumption is offered by John Walker, founder of 
Autodesk and co-author of AutoCAD: “Any doubts about the veracity of our claim 'our 
development agenda is taken directly from the list of user-requested features' can be easily 
dispelled by comparing [our user-requested] wish list with the features in AutoCAD releases up 
to the present day” (Walker, 1994). 
 
Further, microcomputer software is a component within a larger, complex technological system.  
While not a boundary condition or assumption, this factor suggests an additional source of 
pressure for temporal routines from complement producers.  These complements include 
microprocessors, other computer hardware (e.g., memory, storage), and operating system 
software. 
 
Data 
 
We obtained the starting point of the dataset from PC Data (now NPD INTELECT), a market 
research firm that specializes in information technology markets.  The dataset from PC Data 
includes monthly product sales data in four segments of business productivity computer software   10
from 1994-1998.  The four segments are CAD, desktop publishing, spreadsheets, and word 
processing.  These segments are based on stand-alone applications and do not include sales from 
integrated software suites.  PC Data personnel told us that their data represent the following 
annual percentages of the U.S. retail software market during the five years from 1994 to 1998: 
33%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 80%.  In addition, we supplemented the dataset with extensive 
archival research.   
 
Below, we describe the construction of the CAD segment dataset. We employed a similar 
process for the other three segments. 
 
We constructed a CAD market segment that assumed that products are substitutes in terms of 
functionality.  The initial PC Data database had two limitations that prevented the initial 
comparison of products as substitutes.  First, PC Data reported the product data at a stock-
keeping unit.  Therefore, when multiple formats or versions existed within a product family, we 
aggregated the individual products into one representative product family.  For example, we 
aggregated Turbo Cad, Turbo Cad 5.0, and Turbo Cad Academic into a representative Turbo Cad 
product family.  The Turbo Cad product family represents the product offering from the Turbo 
Cad organization.  In many cases, the organizations in this study are business units within larger 
firms. 
 
Second, the PC Data database included products that are not substitutes.  For example, PC Data 
listed add-on products and products that are similar in content but different in functionality 
alongside traditional products.  To address this issue, we constructed more precise market 
segments with the assistance of secondary data sources.  This construction proceeded in two 
phases: (1) reducing the PC Data database into a set of products that perform similar functions, 
and (2) segmenting the remaining products into competitively-equivalent markets. 
 
The first phase of construction required the identification of products that perform similar 
functions.  This categorization relied on the primary classification by PC Data, which represents 
the industry standard.  We then narrowed the PC Data list of products to a more precise set, using 
secondary data sources to confirm product similarity.  We primarily accessed secondary data 
sources through information databases, such as Dow Jones Interactive, Infotrac, and Proquest.  
Specific referenced publications included Business Wire, Computer Graphics World, Home 
Office Computing, InfoWorld, MacUser, MacWEEK, PC/Computing, PC Magazine, PC Week, 
PR Newswire, The Software Encyclopedia, Windows Magazine, and Windows Sources.  
Company web pages were also accessed as needed and available. 
 
The second phase of construction further segmented products into competitively-equivalent 
markets.  This ensured comparison within distinct market segments.  We segmented the product 
markets by format and tier of market.  First, in terms of format, the categorization focused on 
operating platform.  During the 1994-1998 empirical window, there was a clear market 
distinction between products for IBM-compatible and Macintosh computers.  Within the IBM-
compatible system, two dominant operating platforms were present: DOS and Windows.  
Therefore, we segmented the products into three respective operating platforms: (1) DOS for 
IBM-compatible, (2) Windows for IBM-compatible, and (3) Macintosh.  Second, market tier 
refers to the feature/price level within a product category (e.g., high-end, low-end).  We used   11
product comparison reports in the trade press from 1988-1998 to guide segmentation by market 
tier.   
 
Based on these reports, we divided the CAD market into high-end CAD software for the 
microcomputer (approximately $3000 in list price) and low-end CAD software (less than $1000 
in list price).  However, only certain high-end CAD products are sold through the retail channel 
that PC Data tracks.  Therefore, this study does not analyze the high-end CAD segment.  Our 
review of product comparison articles in the trade press revealed a lack of clear segmentation 
within the sub-$1000 products.  We found product comparisons based on sub-$1000, sub-$500, 
sub-$400, and sub-$250 segments.  As a result, we plotted the sub-$1000 products by list price 
and searched for the presence of identifiable clusters.  The highest frequency of products had a 
list price of $500, with numerous products above and below $500.  Therefore, we judged the 
sub-$1000 market to be the most appropriate level for analysis and did not further segment the 
data.  Examples of products in this segment include AutoCAD LT, MiniCAD, and TurboCAD. 
 
The final stage of archival research involved tracing the innovation history of each product 
family.  We used these histories to identify the cumulative number and timing of generational 
product innovation releases.  The tracing process included a review of every issue of InfoWorld, 
a weekly industry trade publication, from 1981-1990.  Our initial year, 1981, is an appropriate 
beginning period because IBM introduced its personal computer in that year (Langlois, 1992; 
Cringely, 1996), leading 1981 to be labeled as the beginning of the second era in 
microcomputing (Cringely, 1996). The tracing process involved archival searches with 
secondary data sources via information databases and company web pages.  Consistent 
availability of product innovation data via information databases began in approximately the 
mid-1980s.  Therefore, the combination of reviewing InfoWorld from 1981-1990 and searching 
information databases from their earliest available dates (typically the early 1980s) through the 
end of 1998 provided a comprehensive approach to gathering archival data. Finally, if necessary 
and available, we contacted companies directly to help resolve any uncertainties. 
 
In addition to the CAD segment, we analyzed the desktop publishing, spreadsheets, and word-
processing segments.  The dataset construction process was similar for the three remaining 
segments.  Guided by the trade press, we identified two market segments for desktop publishing: 
high-end (approximately $500-$900 in list price) and low-end (approximately $100-$300).  
However, PC Data did not list a well-known low-end desktop publishing product.  Therefore, 
this study does not analyze the low-end segment.  We identified a single segment for 
spreadsheets, with list prices in the range of $100 to $600.  For the word-processing category, we 
identified two segments: high-end (approximately $350-$700 in list price) and low-end 
(approximately $50-$250).  There was very little innovation activity in the low-end word 
processing market, and the category itself largely disappeared by the end of 1998.  Due to lack of 
variance on the dependent variable, this study does not analyze the low-end of the word 
processing market. 
 
Operational variables 
 
There are three focal variables in the empirical model.  The dependent variable is generational 
product innovation, and the explanatory variables are the time since previous innovation and   12
organizational size.  Control variables include age, cumulative number of product innovations, 
market concentration, market size, market generational product innovations, and operating 
system platform.  After data collection, we calculated the operational variables using a series of 
Visual Basic macro programs within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  In addition to the standard 
calculation procedures, where appropriate, the process involved the development and execution 
of recalculation procedures to check the calculations.   
 
Dependent variable.  We operationalized generational product innovation (GenProdInnov) by a 
binary variable (1 for the month in which a generational product innovation release occurs, and 0 
otherwise).
2  Overall there were 72 generational product innovation events among 46 
organizations competing in four segments of microcomputer applications software from 1994 to 
1998.   
 
In identifying generational product innovations, we focused our attention on whether a release 
represented a significant advance in technical performance, relative to the existing product.  One 
concern associated with this measure was to ensure that generational releases are distinguished 
from minor bug-fix releases.  In both cases, we expect the technical performance of the product 
to improve (Lawless and Anderson, 1996), but we assume the significance of the advance to be 
much smaller in the bug-fix release.  Further, while generational release dates can be identified 
with archival data, the trade press does not publish many of the bug-fix release dates.  To address 
the significance of technical advance, we reviewed trade press information for individual product 
innovation releases.   
 
To distinguish generational product innovations from other types of innovation within the 
applications software context, we focused on three dimensions: (a) the number and magnitude of 
feature additions/enhancements, (b) the numbering convention for the product innovation release 
(i.e., Version 1.0, 1.01, 1.1, 2.0), and (c) the pricing schedule for the product innovation release 
(e.g., upgrade list price relative to full list price).  Through historical observation of the trade 
press, we found that the latter two dimensions typically reflect the first dimension.  Examining 
trade press information with particular attention to these three dimensions provided a heuristic 
guide for distinguishing generational product innovation releases from bug-fix releases.  As an 
example, for the price dimension, a useful guide was whether the upgrade list price was greater 
than or less than 10% of the full list price. 
 
Our objective was to triangulate in determining whether a product release was classified as a 
generational product innovation.  We examined multiple accounts in the trade press with 
attention directed to the three aforementioned dimensions.  For the majority of product releases, 
data was available on all three dimensions, and the evidence on these dimensions was consistent 
(either toward a generational product innovation classification or against it).  When the evidence 
was conflicting across dimensions, or when trade press information was missing for a particular 
dimension, our classification was based on the majority of evidence for the three dimensions. 
 
Explanatory variables.  Time since previous innovation (TimeSinceInnov) is the elapsed time 
since previous product innovation.  The previous innovation may be the initial product release or 
the most recent generational product innovation.  We represented time since previous innovation 
with a monthly clock, which started at one for the first month following the month in which an   13
innovation occurred (the initial innovation or a generational product innovation).  The clock 
increased by one for each month until the first month after a new generational product innovation 
was released; at this point, the clock reset to one.   
 
We operationalized the organizational size measure (OrgSize) as the total number of product 
units sold by the organization, lagged one time period and logged.  The organization size 
measure was lagged to address potential simultaneity, and we used its logarithm based on our 
expectation that the effect diminishes with increases in organizational size.  For calculation 
purposes (i.e., zero as a nuisance value), we added one to the lag of organizational size prior to 
taking its logarithm. Since we study the interaction between the explanatory variables, for 
interpretative purposes, we centered the organizational size and time since previous innovation 
variables (Aiken and West, 1991). 
 
Control variables.  Age of the organizational unit (Age) is the number of months since the 
initial release of the product.  Some researchers have argued that, over time, organizations 
develop routines that inhibit change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  Other research suggests that 
organizations become more fluid with age.  In attempts to reconcile this work, Singh and 
Lumsden (1990) suggest that the effect of age on organizational change depends on whether the 
change is core or peripheral.  However, a recent review of empirical work in this area highlights 
mixed findings on the age-change relationship, beyond consideration of the core-peripheral 
reconciliation efforts (Baum, 1999). 
 
Cumulative number of previous innovations (TotPrevInnov) is a count measure, which increases 
by one for each introduction of a generational product innovation.  The cumulative number of 
generational product innovations is a measure of repetitive momentum (Amburgey and Miner, 
1992; Amburgey, et al., 1993).  In this case, increases in cumulative innovation lead to greater 
experience with innovation, which suggests increased likelihood of future innovations 
(Amburgey and Miner, 1992).  Reviewing empirical studies, Baum (1999) found strong support 
for a positive effect of repetitive momentum on innovation. 
 
We used a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index to measure market concentration (MktConc), using 
market share in terms of unit sales.  The index is defined as the sum of the squared values of 
products' market share (Curry and George, 1983).  A large body of work in industrial 
organization economics examines the effect of market concentration on innovation (Cohen, 
1995; Cohen and Levin, 1989).  This stream of research provides alternative arguments about the 
relationship.  Some researchers argue for a positive effect.  This argument suggests that in 
concentrated markets, rivalry has greater certainty.  Moreover, less certainty regarding extent of 
rivalry could reduce incentives for innovation (Schumpeter, 1942).  Others argue for a negative 
effect, suggesting that greater market concentration leads to less direct competitive incentive for 
investment in innovation (Hennipman, 1954; Scherer, 1980).   
 
A market size (MktSize) variable recorded the total number of product units sold in a given 
market, lagged one time period and logged. We added one to the lag of market size prior to 
taking its logarithm because in a few instances (e.g., late 1998), a given month had zero product 
sales for an application category on the DOS platform. Arguments for an effect of market size on 
innovative activity include firms’ positioning themselves in emerging niches (Porter, 1980) or   14
firms’ trying to reinvigorate declining markets (Miller, 1990).  Researchers have found 
significant effects of market size on competitive behavior (Miller and Chen, 1994; Bayus and 
Putsis, 1999). 
 
Market generational product innovation (MktInnov) is a binary variable that indicates whether 
any peer organizations within a market released a generational product innovation in the 
previous time period.  We employed a binary variable due to the few instances in which more 
than one innovation release by peer organizations occurred in the previous time period.  
Institutional theorists have argued that organizations imitate the behavior of their peers 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  In addition, researchers of competitive rivalry suggest that 
organizations are likely to respond to competitive moves by peer organizations (Chen, 1996).  
Relative to this measure, we highlight that in the applications software industry, there tends to be 
significant levels of signaling and transparency associated with innovation releases.  Thus, we 
expect that peer organizations have knowledge of upcoming innovation releases prior to the 
actual event. 
 
We included dummy variables for operating system markets (DOS, WIN), using effect-coding: 
DOS organization-month observations (1 for DOS, 0 for WIN), Windows organization-month 
observations (0 for DOS, 1 for WIN), and Macintosh organization-month observations (-1 for 
DOS, -1 for WIN).  As such, a negative effect for either the DOS variable or the WIN variable 
indicates a respective likelihood of generational product innovation that is significantly below 
the average likelihood.  The average likelihood is taken across DOS, Windows, and Macintosh 
platforms for all organization-month observations. 
 
A market density (MktDens) variable recorded the total number of organizations operating in a 
market, lagged one time period.  We included this variable in a selection equation for our 
discrete-time (probit) analyses, rather than in the focal equation.  As we discuss in the next 
section, the discrete-time analysis involves simultaneous estimation of two equations.  With this 
approach, the selection equation requires at least one unique variable.  While many of the 
variables in the focal model and selection model were common, we included market density as 
unique to the selection equation.  The variable draws from density dependence research in 
organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).  Researchers argue for a curvilinear effect 
of density on survival.  Due to institutional legitimacy, increases in density initially increase the 
likelihood of survival.  Then beyond a threshold, due to competitive interactions, increases in 
density decrease the likelihood of survival (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Baum, 1999).  Since the 
empirical analysis focuses on a developed industry state, and to minimize the number of 
variables in the model given a limited number of selection events, we included only a linear 
effect for density, expecting a negative effect of density on survival based on the competitive 
interactions argument. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations.  In the analyses, the total number of 
observations was 2617 organization-months: 2592 uncensored observations (indicating that the 
organization remained on the market throughout the month) and 25 censored observations 
(indicating that the organization did not remain on the market beyond that month).   
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Models and analyses 
 
We used both discrete and continuous time approaches for the analysis.  While we expect similar 
findings, each approach offers distinct advantages.  With the discrete-time approach, we employ 
a more favorable means of accounting for the potential of selection bias.  With the continuous-
time approach, we incorporate historical time effects through the distribution.  We perform both 
sets of analyses to examine the sensitivity of our results. 
 
Discrete time approach.  The discrete-time approach applied a probit model with selection.  
Since organizations may select out of a market during the time window of data, the model needs 
to account for the potential of survival bias in the estimates.  As such, we employed a probit 
model with selection (van de Ven and van Praag, 1981), which extends from Heckman (1979).  
This model estimates the two equations (focal equation and selection equation) simultaneously 
using maximum likelihood.  We used the heckprob command in the Stata statistical software 
package to perform the analyses.   
 
As an illustration of survival bias, consider the following scenario.  Suppose that the objective is 
to understand the effect of organizational size on the likelihood of generational product 
innovation.  Further suppose that (1) organizational size has positive effects on the likelihood of 
generational product innovation and the likelihood of survival, and (2) the likelihood of 
generational product innovation is higher among surviving organizations than among otherwise 
identical organizations that are failing.  In this scenario, the marginal effect of organizational size 
has two elements: its influence on the likelihood of survival and its influence on the likelihood of 
generational product innovation among the surviving organizations.  Under these conditions, 
without controlling for selection, the model would overstate the marginal effect of organizational 
size on the likelihood of generational product innovation (Greene, 2000).  For more information 
regarding sample selection bias, see Greene (2000) and Heckman (1979). 
 
Several factors influenced our choice of the probit technique: censoring, a repeated-event 
dependent variable, variation within and across organizations, and infrequency of event 
occurrences.  In event history studies, censoring is often a concern.  In this study, left-censoring 
refers to organizational activity prior to the start of the data window, and right-censoring refers to 
activity after the end of our data window.  Left-censoring is not a large concern because 
generational innovations are repeated events and, with archival research, we were able to collect 
pre-window data for the occurrence of earlier events (Allison, 1984).  This is also known as left 
truncation.  Here, the primary limitation associated with left-truncation was that the empirical 
window begins at a relatively-mature stage of the industry.   
 
Allison (1995) argues that discrete-time probit or logit models are appropriate techniques for 
event history studies, given right-censored cases and time-varying covariates.  Probit and logit 
models are standard approaches to analyzing binary choices.  The models differ in their 
assumptions about the distribution of the error term.  Probit models assume a cumulative normal 
distribution, while logit models assume that the cumulative distribution is logistic.  However, 
these models typically yield similar results, as the difference in distributions is small, with the 
exception of the tails (Maddala, 1992).  In further support of discrete-time probit and logit 
models, Petersen (1995: 499) comments that "if the probability of an event in each time interval   16
is small, then the coefficients obtained from a discrete-time specification for most models will be 
quite close to those obtained from a continuous-time specification."  In this study, on average, 
the probability of an event in any time period is small (0.027). 
 
Standard probit and logit models may be complicated by the longitudinal nature of the study.  
The unobserved factors within organizations may lead to correlated error terms if additional 
controls are not implemented.  But statisticians and econometricians have found that ignoring the 
error correlations and using a standard probit model with pooled data yields consistent, albeit 
inefficient, estimates (Maddala, 1987; Robinson, 1982).  As such, Maddala (1987) has 
recommended the use of the standard probit with pooled data prior to the use of more elaborate 
models. 
 
Of the more elaborate discrete-time models, two offer potential interest: (a) fixed effects logit 
model, and (b) random effects probit model (Maddala, 1987; Verbeek, 2000).  A fixed effects 
logit model controls for an effect of each organization, emphasizing within-organization 
variation.  For this study, the major disadvantage of this approach would arise from the 
relatively-small number of generational product innovation events occurring within 
organizations during the window of data.  As such, there is likely to be low power associated 
with the use of a fixed effects logit model.   
 
The second option, the random effects probit model, is more favorable but also has limitations.  
Relative to the pooled probit model, the random effects approach yields more efficient estimates.  
The common form of the random effects probit is the Gauss-Quadrature model, which handles 
unbalanced panel data well.  Its primary disadvantage is the assumption that the random effects 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which does not hold in many cases.  The 
Chamberlain model, a correlated random effects approach, provides a more flexible technique.  It 
allows the random effects to depend on current, future, and past explanatory variables (Maddala, 
1987).  Unfortunately, the Chamberlain model is not well-suited for unbalanced panel data.  
 
Given the above factors, we selected the standard probit model with pooled data as the most 
appropriate discrete-time technique; we also incorporate selection into the model (Allison, 1995; 
Maddala, 1987; van de Ven and van Praag, 1981).  As an improvement to the standard pooled 
probit model, we clustered observations at the organization-platform level (e.g., Microsoft Word 
on the Macintosh operating platform) using the robust option to calculate standard errors.  This 
approach provides better estimation of the standard errors, versus an assumption of independence 
across observations. 
 
Continuous time approach.  For the continuous-time approach, we used parametric analysis.  
Historical time is the time axis for the analyses.  As suggested by our hypotheses, we have 
chosen to model duration dependence through covariates (i.e., time since previous innovation), 
leaving only historical time effects to model through the distribution.  Further, using historical 
time as the time axis eases the comparison of our continuous-time and discrete-time approaches.  
Beginning with our discrete-time formation of the dataset, the explanatory and control variables 
are updated monthly.  The selection (OnMkt) and generational product innovation variables 
(GenProdInnov) are also updated monthly.  Following Petersen's (1991) approximation to   17
minimize time aggregation bias, we set the selection and innovation events to the mid-point in 
their months of occurrence. 
 
As we transition to the continuous-time approach, one of the first issues to address is controlling 
for survival bias.  While the discrete-time probit model can estimate the focal and selection 
equations simultaneously, similar models are not available for continuous time.  Therefore, we 
used Lee's (1983) generalization of the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimator.  Using the same set 
of explanatory variables for the probit selection equation, we first estimated a separate selection 
model.  For the selection model, we compared five different parametric models: exponential, 
Weibull, Gompertz, log-normal, and log-logistic.  Among the first three models, we found that 
the exponential model provided the best fit according to the AIC criteria.  Further, we observed 
that the Weibull and Gompertz models could not exclude the exponential distribution at a 95% 
confidence level.  We also estimated log-normal and log-logistic models, finding that the log-
normal model had the most favorable AIC score while the log-logistic model had the least 
favorable AIC score (of the five models).  Next we compared the overall fit of the exponential 
and log-normal models using the Cox-Snell residuals, finding that the exponential model clearly 
provided a better fit than the log-normal model.  Therefore, we used the exponential distribution 
for the selection model.  Next we calculated the following estimate of lambda (Lee, 1983): 
 
l = [f(F
-1[1-F(t)])]/F(t)] 
 
with f as the standard normal density and F as the standard normal distribution.  We then 
included the lambda estimate in the focal model (GenProdInnov) to control for survival bias.  We 
do not report the results of this model, as they were substantively similar to the probit selection 
equation. 
 
Next we proceeded to the generational product innovation model.  Again we used the robust 
option to calculate standard errors, clustering the observations at the organization-platform level.  
We estimated the same five parametric models as in the selection model.  In a nested 
comparison, we found that the Weibull outperformed the exponential model (p=0.06), finding a 
monotonically increasing hazard for the Weibull specification. Based on the AIC criterion, we 
found the following three models as most favorable (in order): log-logistic, log-normal, and 
Weibull.  As a further comparison, we examined the overall fit of the log-logistic and Weibull 
models using the Cox-Snell residuals.  The model fits were similar, with a slightly better fit for 
the log-logistic model. 
 
Both the log-logistic and Weibull findings are consistent with a maturing markets perspective of 
innovation rates.  This perspective suggests that, as markets develop, innovation rates proceed 
along an S-curve.  In the initial stages of market development, innovation rates increase at an 
increasing rate, followed by rates that increase at a decreasing rate (with decreasing innovation 
rates likely in later stages).  With the log-logistic parametric model, we found an innovation rate 
that follows an S-curve pattern; within our data window, the pattern was largely the upper 
portion of the curve.  With the Weibull parametric model, we found an innovation rate that 
follows a monotonically increasing pattern, consistent with the upper portion of an S-curve 
pattern.  
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Given similar findings between the log-logistic and Weibull models, we decided to present the 
Weibull model for two reasons.  First, the Weibull estimates can be displayed in a hazard metric, 
as opposed to an accelerated failure time metric, which aligns more directly with our stated 
hypotheses and facilitates comparison between the discrete-time and continuous-time 
approaches.  Second, the Weibull model provides more conservative results relative to our 
hypotheses. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the results for the discrete-time (probit) model.  The focal equation has 
generational product innovation as the dependent variable. These results are presented above the 
selection equation results in Table 2.  The dependent variable for the selection equation is 
whether an organization remains on the market.  We operationalized selection (OnMkt) as a 
binary variable (1 if the organization's product remains on the market throughout the end of the 
time period, and 0 otherwise).  Table 3 presents the results for the continuous-time model, 
employing a Weibull distribution.  We report the results in a hazard metric.  Following Lee 
(1983), the analyses included a lambda estimate from a separate selection model to control for 
survival bias.   
 
To test the hypotheses, we examined three nested models.  Since we employ the clustering/robust 
option to calculate standard errors, we were not able to conduct incremental likelihood ratio tests.  
Model 1 is the baseline model, which has a set of control variables and intercept term.  To assess 
Hypothesis 1, Model 2 added two measures to the baseline model: (a) time since previous 
innovation, and (b) the square of time since previous innovation.  Our test for Hypothesis 1 
focuses on the coefficient for the square of time since previous innovation (TimeSinceInnovSq).  
Note that, with TimeSinceInnovSq in the model, the TimeSinceInnov coefficient represents the 
effect of time since previous innovation on generational product innovation when 
TimeSinceInnov = 0 (its mean, since the variable is centered). 
 
Model 3 examined the consistency of the evidence with respect to Hypothesis 2.  Model 3 added 
two interaction terms: (a) organizational size and time since previous innovation, and (b) 
organizational size and the square of time since previous innovation.  Our test for Hypothesis 2 
focuses on the coefficient for the interaction between organizational size (OrgSize) and the 
square of time since previous innovation (TimeSinceInnovSq).  The interpretation of the 
OrgSize*TimeSinceInnov coefficient follows from the previous discussion of the interpretation 
of the TimeSinceInnov coefficient in Model 2.  In Tables 2 and 3, given the predicted directions 
of our hypotheses, we present one-tail test results. 
 
The presence of temporal routines for generational product innovation 
 
Model 2 examined the empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1.  This hypothesis focuses on the 
presence of temporal routines for generational product innovation.  We expect a negative effect 
for the square of time since previous innovation.  We found strong support for Hypothesis 1 from 
both the probit and Weibull models.  The coefficient for TimeSinceInnovSq is negative and 
significant in the probit (p<0.001) and the Weibull (p<0.01) models.  Also, note that the   19
TimeSinceInnov coefficient is positive, which indicates that the inverse-U shaped relationship 
peaks to the right of the mean of time since previous innovation. 
 
In examining the control variables across the probit and Weibull models, we generally found 
similar results with some differences in significance levels: a negative effect for the DOS 
platform (p<0.05 on probit, not significant on Weibull), a positive effect for the Windows 
platform (p<0.10 on probit, not significant on Weibull), a negative effect for market 
concentration (p<0.05 on probit, p<0.01 on Weibull), and a negative effect for organizational age 
(p<0.001 on both).  Of particular interest was the effect of organizational size (positive and p < 
0.001 on probit, negative and not significant on Weibull).  In the following section, we discuss 
the different findings for organizational size.   
 
Between the probit and Weibull approaches, we also observed differences in selection bias.  One 
difference is in the direction of the bias coefficients.  If the bias effect is consistent across the 
two approaches, the rho (probit) and lambda (Weibull) coefficients should have the same 
direction (Greene, 2000).   But this difference is an artifact of our use of alternative numbering 
conventions for the selection dependent variable.
3  We also found differences in the level of 
statistical significance.  While this effect is not the focus of our investigation, we conducted 
additional analyses to better understand the issue.  First, we observed that a portion of the 
difference in statistical significance comes from a suppressing effect of historical time.  
Including an effect of historical time in the continuous-time approach leads to greater 
significance for lambda by controlling for, or suppressing, variance that is shared with lambda 
and not with the likelihood of innovation (Pedhazer, 1982).
4   
 
The difference in statistical significance also stems from the nature of estimation between the 
simultaneous and two-stage approaches.  In subsequent analyses with the simultaneous probit, 
we found some sensitivity in selection bias from including the log of historical time as a 
predictor variable.  But even after including a historical time effect, the selection bias did not 
approach statistical significance at conventional levels.  However, we found statistical 
significance for lambda in two-stage discrete-time models (probit, logit and complementary log-
log) after including the log of historical time.  These results suggest that our finding of selection 
bias in the continuous-time approach is, in part, a function of the two-stage estimation process. 
 
The moderating effect of organizational size 
 
Model 3 provided the empirical evidence regarding Hypotheses 2.  This hypothesis predicts that, 
as organizational size increases, organizations are more likely to employ temporal routines for 
generational product innovation.  According to Hypothesis 2, we expect to find a negative effect 
for the interaction between organizational size and the square of time since previous innovation.  
We found support for Hypothesis 2 with both the probit model (p<0.001) and the Weibull model 
(p<0.01).   
 
In examining the control variables, we found similar results compared to Model 2.  As one 
distinction of note in Model 3, we observed that both approaches have a positive coefficient for 
OrgSize (p<0.01 on probit, not significant on Weibull), indicating a positive effect of OrgSize on 
generational product innovation at the means of TimeSinceInnov and OrgSize.  In subsequent   20
analyses, we determined that the difference in significance levels largely stems from the 
inclusion of a historical time effect in the Weibull model, reflecting a degree of shared variance 
between the organizational size and historical time variables.   
 
Given the interactive nature of the effect of organizational size and time since previous 
innovation, we further examined this relationship (Aiken and West, 1991).  First, we plotted the 
effect of time since previous innovation on generational product innovation for three levels of 
organizational size: OrgSizeL (small organizations: one standard deviation below the mean), 
OrgSizeM (medium-sized organizations: at the mean of organizational size), and OrgSizeH (large 
organizations: one standard deviation above the mean).  We prepared plots for both discrete-time 
(Figure 3) and continuous-time (Figure 4) approaches.  The plots used coefficients from Model 3 
in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  For the x-axis (TimeSinceInnov), the plot extends from the 
negative-end of the data range (TimeSinceInnov = -21.4) to +2 standard deviations 
(TimeSinceInnov = 38.6).  Figures 3 and 4 report these plots. 
 
For the discrete-time plot (Figure 3), along the y-axis is a Z-score, which is an unobservable 
variable common to probit models.  To equate the Z-score with the probability of the occurrence 
of a generational product innovation event, consider a standard normal distribution curve.  The 
probability of event occurrence is equal to the area under the curve from negative infinity to the 
Z-score.  As reference, a -2.4 Z-score is equivalent to < 1% probability of event occurrence 
(single asterisk, Figure 3).  A -1.25 Z-score is equivalent to 11% probability of event occurrence 
(double asterisk, Figure 3).   
 
For the continuous-time plot (Figure 4), along the y-axis is the instantaneous rate of generational 
product innovation.  Alternatively, we could present Figure 4 with the multiplier of the rate along 
the y-axis.  The multiplier is the multiplicative effect of a variable on the rate.  If a multiplier is 
greater than one, the rate increases; if it is less than one, the rate decreases.  As points of 
reference, at TimeSinceInnov = -16, the multiplier for small organizations is 0.3 and that of large 
organizations is 0.1.  At TimeSinceInnov = 8, the multipliers for small and large organizations 
are 1.0 and 1.5, respectively. 
 
In comparing Figures 3 and 4, a notable distinction is the nature of the curvature in the 
relationship.  In the Weibull model (Figure 4), the rate of innovation is an exponential function 
of the covariate effects.  This approach restricts the rate of innovation to positive values and 
explains the curvature distinction between Figures 3 and 4.  These figures help illustrate our 
differing findings for the effect of organizational size in Model 2.  In Figure 3 (probit estimates), 
we observe a positive effect of organizational size on innovation for the large majority of the 
time since previous innovation range.  This is consistent with the positive and significant effect 
of organizational size in Model 2, Table 2.  In Figure 4 (Weibull estimates), we observe a 
negative effect of organizational size on innovation for a slight majority of the range of time 
since previous innovation.  This is consistent with a negative and insignificant effect of 
organizational size in Model 2, Table 3.  As discussed above, the difference in the organizational 
size effect reflects, in part, the inclusion of a historical time effect in the Weibull model. 
 
From Figure 3, when organizational size was low, there was little curvature in the relationship 
between time since previous innovation and likelihood of generational product innovation.  As   21
organizational size increased, however, Figure 3 highlights an increasingly inverse-U shaped 
relationship.  These visual observations are consistent with Hypothesis 2.  Note that the peak of 
the curve corresponds with the most likely length of time until a generational product innovation 
event.  One can calculate this length of time by using coefficient estimates from Model 3 (Table 
2).  For this calculation, we took the derivative of the estimated GenProdInnov function with 
respect to TimeSinceInnov and set it equal to zero.  For medium-sized organizations, we found 
that the most likely length of time until a generational product innovation is 30 months.  
 
Next we transitioned from visual observation to statistical analysis using a series of simple slope 
tests (Aiken and West, 1991).  The simple slope tests use the discrete-time analysis.  Here nine 
simple slopes examined the effect of time since previous innovation on generational product 
innovation.  These tests were various combinations of organizational size (OrgSizeL, OrgSizeM, 
OrgSizeH) and time since previous innovation (TimeSinceInnovL, TimeSinceInnovM, 
TimeSinceInnovH).  The subscripts are as follows: L (one standard deviation below the mean), M 
(the mean), and H (one standard deviation above the mean).  See Table 4 for the test results. 
 
For small organizations, when time since previous innovation was low, there was a positive 
effect of time since previous innovation on generational product innovation (p<0.05); when time 
since previous innovation was high, its effect was negative and weakly significant (p<0.10).  For 
medium-sized and large organizations, when the time since previous innovation was low, there 
was a positive effect on generational product innovation (p<0.001).  Finally, when the time since 
previous innovation was high, there was a negative effect on generational product innovation 
(p<0.01). 
 
Using the results from the simple slope tests, we also examined the effect of organizational size 
on generational product innovation at various levels of time since previous innovation.  In this 
case, slope tests examined the effect of organizational size on generational product innovation at 
three levels of time since previous innovation: TimeSinceInnovL, TimeSinceInnovM, and 
TimeSinceInnovH.  Here we observed that when little time had elapsed since the previous 
innovation (TimeSinceInnovL), there was only an insignificant negative effect of organizational 
size on the likelihood of generational product innovation.  At the mean of time since previous 
innovation (TimeSinceInnovM), there was a positive effect of organizational size on the 
probability of generational product innovation (p<0.01).  Then, after much time has elapsed since 
the previous innovation (TimeSinceInnovH), we found a weakly significant positive effect of 
organizational size on generational product innovation (p<0.10). 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
 
The standard analyses included a set of control variables to help account for alternative 
explanations of innovation activity.  For this dataset, however, there are limitations associated 
with using control variables to rule out alternative arguments.  One limitation is the availability 
of data and its cost of acquisition.  A second limitation focuses on the power of the test.  While 
this sample has a relatively large number of organization-month observations (2617), there are 
relatively-few generational product innovation events in the sample (72).  While the first 
limitation is largely unavoidable, in part, we can address the second limitation by including a 
greater number of control variables in separate sets of sensitivity analyses.   22
 
Using discrete-time and continuous-time approaches, we conducted four sets of sensitivity 
analyses: (1) examining whether recent change in market size may be a determinant of 
innovation activity, beyond the recent level in market size, (2) examining whether recent change 
in organization size may be a determinant of innovation activity, beyond the recent level of 
organization size, (3) examining whether two additional lags of innovation by peer organizations 
may be a determinant of innovation activity (i.e., in total, the effect of the previous quarter of 
innovations by peers), and (4) examining whether temporal routines were the result of 
diminished competition, rather than organizational size.  For the last examination, we included 
interactions between (a) MktConc and TimeSinceInnov and (b) MktConc and 
TimeSinceInnovSqr, rather than between (a) OrgSize and TimeSinceInnov and (b) OrgSize and 
TimeSinceInnovSqr.  In all four cases, the additional variables for the sensitivity analyses were 
not significant.  Further, they did not have any substantive impact on the results for our 
hypotheses. 
 
We note that there were moderately-high correlations (0.40-0.50) between several of the control 
and/or explanatory variables.  As a result, we ran three additional sets of discrete-time and 
continuous-time analyses after removing one of the correlated variables: (1) running one set of 
analyses without MktSize, given its correlation with WIN and OrgSize, (2) running one set 
without Age, given its correlation with TotPrevInnov, and (3) running one set of analyses 
without MktConc, given its correlation with TimeSinceInnov.  In all three cases, there were no 
substantive changes in the hypotheses results. 
 
Extension: External entrainment as an alternative explanation 
 
As presented to this point, the results are consistent with the existence of temporal routines for 
generational product innovation.  Our argument centers on pressure within the producing 
organization and pressure between the producing organization and its organizational customers. 
However, an alternative argument based on consistency in the delivery of technological or 
market opportunities could also align with the empirical evidence.  This argument focuses on the 
idea of entrainment, which refers to "the adjustment of the pace or cycle of an activity to match 
or synchronize with that of another activity" (Ancona and Chong, 1996: 253).  We demonstrate 
that, even after controlling for potentially-entraining technological and market opportunity 
events, we still find support for our hypotheses. 
 
There are several candidates for exogenous entrainment in the context of microcomputer 
applications software.  In this extended analysis, we consider two technological opportunity 
variables and one market opportunity variable as synchronous entraining factors.  Synchronous 
entrainment refers to generational product innovation releases of application software that occur 
in the same month as the technological or market opportunity events (Bluedorn, 2002).  As we 
discussed earlier, microcomputer applications software is part of a larger, complex technological 
system.  In addition to applications software, two of the fundamental components in this system 
are the microprocessor and operating system software.  Therefore, for the technological 
opportunity variables, we considered the release of generational product innovations in 
microprocessors and operating system software.  For the market opportunity variable, we used 
the occurrence of major industry trade show events.   23
 
We turned to archival sources to collect data for the technological opportunity variables. We first 
considered microprocessors for IBM-compatible and Macintosh computers. Intel was the 
dominant supplier of microprocessors for the IBM-compatible in this time window.  Using 
archival data from the Intel web site, we examined the organization's history of microprocessor 
innovations in the 1994-1998 timeframe.  Two key dimensions of technological innovation in 
this industry are increases in the number of transistors and increases in the clockspeed.  
Significant increases in the number of transistors associate with the introduction of new classes 
of microprocessors (e.g., Pentium, Pentium II), while increases in clockspeed tend to be minor, 
more frequent innovations.  For Intel, we operationalized technological performance in terms of 
significant increases in the number of transistors observing two generational product innovations 
within this time period.   
 
For the Macintosh, Motorola was the dominant supplier of microprocessors in this time window.  
Using archival data from Apple-based web sites, supplemented with trade press, we examined 
the history of microprocessor innovations for the Macintosh in the 1994-1998 timeframe.  In this 
case, detailed information was available for clockspeed but not for the number of transistors.  
However, significant increases in the top-end clockspeed for a microprocessor are typically 
associated with large increases in the number of transistors (i.e., the introduction of new classes 
of microprocessors).  Therefore, we used significant increases in the top-end clockspeed as a 
proxy for generational product innovation among microprocessors for the Macintosh.  We 
observed three generational product innovations for Macintosh microprocessors within this time 
period.   
 
The microprocessor innovation variable (TechOppMP) is a binary variable. Zeros represent the 
absence of generational product innovation releases and ones represent the occurrence of 
generational product innovation releases. 
 
We then considered operating system software.  Microsoft was the dominant supplier of 
operating system software for the IBM-compatible microcomputer in this time window.  Using 
archival data obtained from the Factiva informative database, we identified four generational 
product innovations in this time period.  The first two innovations focused on both corporate and 
end customers (Windows 95, Windows 98), while the second two innovations focused on 
corporate customers (Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 4.0).  Microsoft did not release a 
generational product innovation for the DOS operating system in this timeframe.  For the 
Macintosh operating system, using a combination of Apple-based web sites and the Factiva 
database, we identified three generational product innovations.  The operating system variable 
(TechOppOS) is a binary variable, similar in format to the earlier-described TechOppMP 
variable. 
 
In addition to entrainment deriving from technological opportunities, we also considered an 
entraining factor based on market opportunities in the form of major trade shows.  The 
COMDEX/Fall trade show is recognized as the largest computer trade show in the world.  
Within the 1994-1998 time window, the COMDEX/Fall trade show occurred each year in mid-
November in Las Vegas.  For organizations competing on the IBM-compatible system, 
COMDEX/Fall represented the focal trade show event.  For organizations competing on the   24
Macintosh system, the bi-annual Macworld Expo trade show event offered an alternative venue.  
Within the 1994-1998 time window, Macworld Expo shows were held each January in San 
Francisco and each August in Boston.  The only exception was the occurrence of a July 1998 
Macworld Expo in New York, rather than an August 1998 show in Boston.   
 
The market opportunity variable (MktOpp) is a binary variable.  Zeros represent the absence of 
major trade show events, and ones represent the occurrence of major trade show events.  Guided 
by the trade press, for DOS and Windows organizations, we viewed COMDEX/Fall as the sole 
major trade show.  For Macintosh organizations, we viewed both COMDEX/Fall and the 
Macworld Expos as major trade show events. 
 
Table 5 presents the entrainment results.  The models extend Model 3 from Tables 2 and 3.  As 
such, they are labeled Models 4a and 4b.  For both the probit and Weibull models, we found a 
positive effect of generational product innovation releases of microprocessors and operating 
system software (p<0.05).  We also found a positive and weakly significant effect of major trade 
events (p<0.10).  But, even after inclusion of the entraining variables, we retain empirical 
evidence in support of our hypotheses. 
 
Limitations 
 
There are several limitations associated with the empirical assessment.  First, we studied 
generational product innovation in a single industry, which may limit the generalizability of the 
work.  While generational product innovations are visible and relatively frequent in applications 
computer software, it is important to examine the generalizability of the concept.  We consider 
both product and generational aspects.  With respect to the emphasis on product innovation, 
approximately three-quarters of industrial R&D in the U.S. focuses on product innovation 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990).  With respect to generational innovation, Scherer and Ross (1990: 
642) note that "most industries experience a continuing stream of innovations over time, and in 
many cases, each completed new product or process sets an agenda focusing improvement work 
for the next technological generation." Similarly Schumpeter notes that "improvement in the 
quality of products is hence a practically universal feature of the development of individual 
concerns and industries" (1942: 92) and further that "a new type of machine is in general but a 
link in a chain of improvements" (1942: 98). While somewhat limiting, studying innovation in a 
single industry context offers the opportunity to develop an appropriate operationalization of the 
innovation concept.  Cohen and Levin (1989: 1026) note that currently there is not a measure of 
innovation that "permits readily interpretable cross-industry comparisons."   
 
Second, in addition to a cross-sectional limitation (i.e., a single industry), the data is limited 
longitudinally.  Due to cost and data availability limitations, we could examine only a relatively-
developed stage of the computer software industry.  This necessarily limits our ability to study 
how these routines emerged in the earliest stages of the industry. Nonetheless, generational 
product innovation within more established markets is an important phenomenon. 
 
Third, the number of generational product innovation events in the dataset is relatively small.  
The limited number of events posed a power concern, limiting our analytic technique options.  In 
particular, we were unable to employ fixed-effects that could control for the likelihood of   25
innovation by each organization.  Fortunately, statisticians and econometricians demonstrate that 
this limitation is a minor one, resulting only in less efficient estimates (Maddala, 1987; 
Robinson, 1982).  Therefore, while the theory allows organizations to differ in the length of time 
between generational product innovations, an assumption of commonality in time intervals 
across organizations limits the empirical test.  Note that in order to examine a fixed organization 
effect for temporal routines, it may be necessary to include not only an effect for the likelihood 
of innovation by each organization but also a fixed effect for time since previous innovation by 
each organization.  In this case, future empirical work in this area could require substantial 
length in data panels to study organization-specific temporal routines. 
 
In summary, we found results that are consistent with temporal routines for generational product 
innovation.  First, in a developed stage of the microcomputer applications software industry, 
organizations employed temporal routines for generational product innovation.  Second, with 
increasing size, organizations had a greater tendency to employ these routines.  Third, even after 
controlling for potentially-entraining exogenous factors (e.g., generational product innovation 
releases of microprocessors), we found empirical evidence of temporal routines for generational 
product innovation. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Understanding the implications of time-based pacing of innovation has been an area of emerging 
interest in the organizations literature.  Through inductive theory development, Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997) and Gersick (1994) have made important contributions to this line of research.  
At the same time, though, we have limited understanding as to why organizations employ time-
based patterns of innovation.  Examining this research question is worthy of our attention, 
particularly as Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) posit a positive influence of time-based pacing on 
organizational performance.  In this study, we draw from routines-based theory in our 
examination of time-based pacing of product innovation. 
 
Our results lend support to a temporal routines-based perspective of generational product 
innovation in the computer software industry.  We find that, on average, software organizations 
employ temporal routines for generational product innovation.  In further analysis, we find 
stronger evidence of temporal routines in larger organizations.  The results imply that there are 
scale-based conditions that precede the employment of temporal routines for generational 
product innovation.  This implication sheds light on routines-based theory from two vantage 
points.  First, from a rational investment perspective, it suggests that organizations undertake the 
costs of establishing routines for innovation in response to scale-based coordination needs.  
Second, from the perspective of constraints on change, the implication suggests that after 
establishing routines for innovation, organizations face significant pressures that inhibit their 
ability to break or change the established routines. 
 
The results of this study also make contributions to the inertia perspective from organizational 
ecology.  The seminal contribution in this area is the importation of inertia from physics into 
organizational ecology by Hannan and Freeman (1984).  The Hannan and Freeman (1984) study 
draws from the 'body at rest' aspect of Newton's first law of motion.  In an organizations context, 
the 'body at rest' aspect examines the effect of external forces on organizational change, given an   26
organization in a particular (i.e., unchanging) state.  Less work has examined the 'body in motion' 
aspect of Newton's first law of motion.  This aspect has been termed the dynamics of inertia, and 
in an organizations context, it refers to the idea that a changing organization (i.e., body in 
motion) has a tendency to maintain its existing change behavior.  Terry Amburgey and his 
colleagues have made important contributions to the dynamics of inertia in the form of repetitive 
momentum (Amburgey and Miner, 1992; Amburgey, et al., 1993).  The repetitive momentum 
perspective focuses on a positive effect of the cumulative number of previous changes on the 
probability of repeating an organizational change of the same type.  In reviewing the empirical 
work on organizational ecology, Baum (1999) found that repetitive momentum is unusual in that 
it has strong and consistent support across studies. 
 
Nonetheless, the current view of the dynamics of inertia is incomplete.  In addition to the effect 
of the cumulative number of previous changes, time since previous change influences the 
likelihood of change.  The organizational ecology literature currently focuses on a negative effect 
of the time since previous change on the likelihood of change (Baum, 1999).  The rationale is 
that organizations search locally in time for change solutions.  Thus, organizations are more 
likely to repeat recently-enacted changes.  But in this study, we find that due to the disruptive 
nature of change, organizations are more likely to change at consistent, periodic time intervals.  
Consistent with a dynamics of inertia perspective, this finding underscores the value of viewing 
individual changes as elements within larger, historical patterns of change in organizations. 
 
Substantial future research opportunities surround routines-based theory.  As Winter (1995) 
notes, routines-based theory in evolutionary economics initially arose as a descriptive theory.  
First, we can improve and extend this theory with greater attention to organization- and market-
based factors that enable or constrain the employment of routines.  For example, at the 
organization level, the following two factors may help to explain the employment of routines for 
innovation: (1) market expansion efforts by the organization, and (2) top management team 
beliefs and experiences.  Second, we can expect market attributes to influence the employment of 
routines for innovation.  Third, researchers are beginning to develop performance implications 
from routines-based theory in efforts to guide managerial decision-making (Knott and 
McKelvey, 1999).   
 
This study also offers important implications for practice.  Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) suggest 
performance advantages for organizations that employ time-based pacing of generational 
innovation.  At the same time, though, recent attention to the implications of routines for 
innovation in the practitioner press suggests the importance of viewing routines for innovation 
within a given context or paradigm (Economist, 2003; Red Herring, 2003).  In particular, this 
attention focuses on the adherence to Moore's Law in the semiconductor industry, despite 
declining consumer demand.  In essence, this discussion highlights the implications of 
employing temporal routines for innovation when the assumption of consumer demand for 
repetitive innovation no longer holds.  Commenting on breaks in the cycle of generational 
adoption by semiconductor customers, Marc Andreessen, cofounder of Netscape, notes "this is a 
fundamental, even revolutionary, change in the IT world ... it's going to be disastrous for a lot of 
big companies out there" (Red Herring, 2003: 30).   
   27
The importance of routinized innovation in stimulating technological change and economic 
performance is not new (Schumpeter, 1942).  But our understanding of routines for innovation 
remains limited.  In this study, we offer both theoretical and empirical contributions toward 
further development of a routines-based perspective of innovation.   28
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1     Another anecdote, though, offers an alternative view on the demand perspective on upgrades: "Once the driving 
force behind technological change, [customers] have instead become the protectors of the status quo... five years ago 
having the latest version of an application was an unquestioned necessity... but today, software upgrades and 
changes are driven more by the immediate needs of a project or by corporate dictum than by users eager to use only 
the newest version of a product" (InfoWorld, 1990). 
2     As described in the previous section, we aggregated multiple versions and formats into representative product 
families.  Among the forty-six organizations competing in these market segments, there were three cases in which 
generational product innovation activity occurred for more than one version of the product (e.g., WordStar, 
WordStar 2000) within the market segment.  In only one case, TurboCad on the Windows platform, did this issue 
extend into the time window of the dataset, although the other two cases are relevant for historical tracking of 
variables.  By using the history of product development for the three products, we identified a dominant version of 
the product and used innovation activity for the dominant product version to represent the innovation activity for the 
organization. 
3 Following the Stata heckprob procedure, the selection dependent variable is operationalized with 1 as observed, or 
uncensored, observations and 0 as unobserved, or censored, observations.  In the two-stage continuous-time model, 
we use the standard convention for the selection dependent variable, with 1 as an indication of organizational failure 
(i.e., the censoring event) and 0 otherwise.  Therefore, between the two approaches, we found similar results with 
respect to direction of bias. 
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